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APPELLATE COURTS AND THE QUEST
FOR JUST COMPENSATION
ADDITUR AND REMITTITUR
FRANCIS CONKLIN*
When an appellate court is called upon to review an award of
damages made by a lower branch of the judicial system, what
should it do? The trial court-both judge and jury-were sworn to
do justice, as are the members of the higher tribunal. Yet "justice"
like all transcendent ideals, does not arise untarnished from the
sea, nor drop unannounced from heaven. Justice must be con-
stantly pursued with the fair assurance that it will never be cap-
tivated but only approximated'. With this humiliating reality con-
fronting us we may more properly examine the institutional com-
petence and appropriate role of an appellate court in our system
of jurisprudence when the final award of a lower tribunal is
challenged as excessive, inadequate, or otherwise "unjust".
First, what can an appellate court do? The Supreme Court of
the United States has the practical political responsibility of setting
the fundamental public policy of the entire nation.2 This is merely
another way of saying that the Court's sovereign prerogative con-
sists in its power to declare the constitutional limitations upon all
political bodies in the United States-including lower courts and
judges.8 Subject only to the possibility of conflicting with a federal
public policy, the highest courts of the several states share the
same solemn prerogatives. Our system of government empowers
the highest court of each state with the transcendent power to
determine the public policy of that state-subject only to the tedious
*Dean and Professor of Law, Gonzaga University. A.B. 1947, M.A. 1949. Gonzara
University: S.T.L. 1,956, Alma College; L.L.B. 1961, Georgetown University; L.L.M. 1962,
J.S.D. 1963, Yale University.
1. The pursuit of just compensation in these United States has been well organized
and amply endowed for a number of years. The National Association of Claimant Com-
'pensation Attorneys (NACCA)-now called the American Trial LTawvers Association(ATL)-nrovides a natural habitat for those attorneys who are In pursuit of "more". The
Defense Research Institute provides solace for those attorneys who are gathered in pur-
suit of "less". The Journals, reprints, and assorted pronaganda emanating from these or-
ganizations in the finest of the adversary tradition readily afford a comprehensive cover-
age of cases and arguments which may be utilized in the adjudicative process.
2. See Shatten. The Determination of Public Politc, 51 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
JOURNAL 1048 (1965). Although every decision rendered by an American appellate tribunal
is a public policy decision, the nolicv decisions enunciated as constitutional limitations of
necessity embody and articulate policy decisions of a more fundamental and sweeping
nature.
3. See Rostow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROOATIVE, (1962). See also Corwin, THE 'HIGHER
LAW' BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (1961).
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process of constitutional amendment or electoral displacement if
the choice of the Court does not substantially echo the vox
populi.
Every decision made by a court of last resort determines the
public policy of the political entities subject to its jurisdiction or
power. The court may, of course, be guided by the legislature
through a host of statutes authorizing such devices as additur or
remittitur--or setting limitations on liability in certain types of
contract or tort action. But the court always carries the trump
card in its power to declare the legislative enactment unconstit-
utional because the legislative effort conflicts with the plain words
of an artfully drawn and deliberately ambiguous document which
we call a written constitution.
The purpose of this brief exigesis on the sovereign powers of
our highest state and federal courts is to bring the topic into proper
perspective. The role of an appellate court in reviewing the pro-
ceedings of a lower court depends in great part upon the real
power of the appellate tribunal. And once the practicing attorney
finally realizes that an American high court has the real power to
do just about anything he can persuade it to do, the mirage of
"settled principles" should quickly evanesce.
Granted that the highest tribunal of the state or nation can do
just about anything that it can be persuaded to do-including
modifying every monetary verdict presented to it-what should it
do when it reviews monetary awards made by inferior tribunals?
What is the best public policy for 1966 and the years beyond?
Over the years, several devices have evolved whereby higher
courts seek to remedy the injustices perpetrated by lower courts
in their excessive or penurious awards of damages. 4 [Sometimes
these procedures have been authorized by statute-more often by
tradition.] 5 If a higher tribunal finds that a lower court award was
excessive, it may grant a remittitur.6 Essentially this consists in
providing the original plaintiff with an option-either to accept a
reduced amount of damages-or face the expense and uncertainty
of a new trial. Should the higher court find the lower court's award
inadequate, it may, in effect, offer the defendant a similar option
4. In all states, trial or appellate courts are generally empowered to grant new trials.
The procedural devices may differ from state to state. One common approach is to call the
motion a judgment n.o.v. Another common device is to grant a new trial limited to the
amount of damages. This article is not concerned with appellate review of these procedural
motions, because the appellate tribunal does not become involved In fixing the monetary
amount of damages.
5. For example, Rule 59.04 W(5) Washington Rules of Pleading, Practice and Pro-
cedure empowers the trial court to grant a new trial in cases where an original verdict
awarded excessive or inadequate damages. This rule has been consistently interpreted to
permit the trial court to make a conditional grant of a new trial. See Lanegan v. Crauford,
49 Wash.2d 462, 304 P.2d 953 (1956); Sherman v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 233, 356
P.2d 316 (1960).
6. The word remittitur may have several meanings. As employed in this article it Is
used in its narrowest sense: the conditional grant of a new trial to a defendant-the
condition being that the plaintiff remit part of the original verdict.
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or additur--either pay a larger sum in damages or face the same
expenses and uncertainty.
The common sense rationalization for these procedures lies in
the economic aspects of justice. If the members of a higher tri-
bunal can agree that a given sum is unjust, the quickest way to
dispose of the matter is to attempt to do substantial justice in the
shortest time possible. Rather than force the injured plaintiff, who
is entitled to something, to bear the expense of another, perhaps
protracted, litigation, the appellate court will attempt to get the
parties to compromise.
The speed and efficiency with which inter-personal disputes are
settled in most cases far outweighs the precise amount of monetary
satisfaction realized. The vast majority of claims of financial li-
ability are settled extra-judicially through agreement and formal
release, arbitration or compromise within private associations which
settle their own disputes. Even in those cases which actually are
initiated in the public forum, a substantial portion are settled
shortly before or during the course of litigation. And of those
which go to judgment in a lower tribunal, the decision not to appeal
finally terminates another large portion of private disputes.
Underlying this practical working of the social process are two
jurisprudential principles or public policies of the highest order:
there must be an end to litigation; and justice delayed is justice
denied. The point here is that the relatively few causes of action
which reach a court of last resort do so because the private or
public mechanisms for resolving disputes at a less rarefied level
have either proved unavailable or have broken down. Thus, the
appellate tribunal utilizes the procedural devices of additur and
remittitur to accomplish the same purposes which the inferior
(and far less expensive) tribunals accomplish in the vast majority
of cases. The court of last resort is formally invested with the
power to impose finality; but it is equally interested in effectuating
the public policy of speedy justice.
Are the procedural devices of additur and remittitur consonant
with sound considerations of public policy? The Supreme Court of
the United States, in Dimick v. Schiedt8 held that the procedure
7. Although sometimes called remittitiir in a generic sense, the ivnrd additur Is ii d
to designate the cnnverse of the sense in which remittitur was nqeed In note 6 qltvra:
additur is a conditional grant of a new trial to a plaintiff-the condition being that thedefendant must either pay more or else face a new trial. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 213
(19,7).
8. 291 U.S. 474 (1934). Accord, Corsey v. Barba, 28 Cal.2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952)
Sarvis v. Folsom, 114 So.2d 490 (Fla. App. 1951). On the problem of rerittltir. the federal
courts and the Seventh Amendment, see Arkansas Land and Cattle v. Mann. 130' U.S. 69(1889). The excellent opinion of Judge Medina in Dagnello v. Long Island Railroad Co., 289
F.2d 797 (2nd Cir. 1961) explains in detail why a federal court of appeals has constitu-
tional power to review the discretion of a trial judge who refused to set aside a verdict
in a Personal Injury action on the grounds of excessiveness. Dagnello. read with Solomon
Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 394 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1961), not only affirms the power of a
federal circuit court to review allegations of excessiveness of jury verdicts, but also re-
sponds to the views of professor Moore in 6 MoonE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3834 (1965), where-
in Professor Moore characterizes the Second and Eighth Circuits as "the most adamant
expounders" of the "old doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions on motions for a new
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of remittitur may stand as historical gloss on the federal Con-
stitution; but that the procedure of additur violates the fundamental
public policy expressed in the Seventh Amendment which guarantees
a trial by jury in all suits at common law.
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting
a remission of the excess for a new trial is not without
plausible support in the view that what remains is included in
the verdict along with the unlawful excess,-in that sense
that it has been found by the jury,-and that the remittitur
has the effect of merely lopping off an excresence. But where
the verdict is too small, an increase by the court is a bald
addition of something which in no sense can be said to be
included in the verdict. Where, therefore, the trial court here
found that the damages awarded by the jury were so in-
adequate as to entitle plaintiff to a new trial, how can it be
held, with any semblance of reason, that that court, with the
consent of the defendant only, may, by assessing an addition-
al amount of damages, bring the constitutional right of the
plaintiff to a jury trial to an end in respect of a matter of
fact which no jury has ever passed upon either explicitly
or by implication? 9
Dimick may be read in the narrowest of confines as applicable
only where the enriched plaintiff objects to the insufficiency of the
additur. But even given this narrow reading, isn't there danger
of marching up the hill and marching down again? For example:
plaintiff is awarded $10,000 by jury trial number one. On appeal
the Circuit Court of Appeals offers plaintiff the impermissible option
of $50,000. The Supreme Court orders a new trial based on the
Dimick reasoning. At the new trial plaintiff is awarded $60,000.
What is to prevent the Circuit Court from employing the authorized
procedure of remittitur and reducing the new award to $50,000--or
less?
Perhaps Dimick now binds the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment."0 If so, there is no further point in discussing additur.
However, Dimick was a five to four decision and the dissenters
trial based on the inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages". Professor Moore's chief
complaint is that the Second and Eighth Circuits do not exercise the discretion which they
have. As will be explained infra, the author of this article disagrees with Professor Moore.
9. Dimtck v. Schiedt. 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1934). For the opposite view see O'Connor v.
Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883 (1956): Fisch v. Manger 24 N.J. 66, 130 A.2d
815 (1957) (dictum).
10. The extent to which the guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights bind the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been continuously de-
bated during the past few years. Certainly all the provisions of the First Amendment now
bind the states. The Supreme Court has declared binding on the states the Fourth Amend-
ment: Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (including the exclusionary rule rejected in
Wolf) Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; part of the Fifth Amendment (self incrimina-
tion) : Malloy v. Hogan, 376 U.S. 1 (1964): Murphy v. New York Waterfront Comm'n., 376
U.S. 52 (1964): Griffin v. California. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) : The Sixth Amendment (con-
frontation) : Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965); (counsel) Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963): The Ninth Amendment
(right to privacy): Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). A special problem Is
presented by Louisiana, which is not a common law state. The civil law approach to the
problem of inadequate or excessive damage awards is delineated in Garafola v. North
River Insurance Co., 153 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1963).
400
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(Stone, Hughes, Brandeis & Cardozo) seem to the author to have
advanced the more persuasive arguments. The majority opinion in
Dimick relies heavily upon a narrow and somewhat technical read-
ing of Anglo-American legal history which is interesting, but would
hardly be persuasive to the pragmatic activists on the Court today.
The decision in Dimick purports to rest upon an acceptance of
the jury's supreme role as triers of "fact". Thus, the permis-
sibility of additur-as a question of public policy-will boil down
to an analysis of the precise role of the jury in our system of
justice. 12 Of recent years, there has been a continuing and oc-
casionally incisive criticism of the jury system as such. This is
not to say that we are ready to abandon the Anglo-Saxon heritage
of trial by jury. But the intangible value which an individual
justice assigns to the role and competency of a jury may have
far more to do with a final award of damages than any amount of
statistical information.
There are, of course, many areas where damages can be
ascertained with a reasonable degree of mathematical precision.
For example, an annuity which will bear interest equal to the pros-
pective earning capacity of a disabled person would be an econom-
ically justifiable award in a case of total disability. If the defendant
has deprived the plaintiff of the latter's capacity to make a living,
such an award would restore that capacity as far as this is humanly
possible. And the same may be said for computations of loss of
business, etc., due to malicious slander-although the actual burden
of proof upon the plaintiff may be formidable."
This underscores quite another aspect of this problem. The-
procedural devices of remittitur and, where permissible, of additur,
may be used to correct a defect in the evidence. It may be that
the record before the appellate court does not adequately sustain
the plaintiff's prayer for relief or the jury's award. In such a case,
it would seem more appropriate for the appellate court (as a
matter of public policy) to remand the case for a new trial with
appropriate instructions as to what it expects in the form of evi-
dence. The purpose of the instructed remand in such a case is to
11. See Kelly, Clio And The Court: An Illicit Love Affair, in KURLAND, THE SUPREME
COURT REVIEW, (1965). The Dimiek opinion, written in the shadow of Holmes, is not free
from the pre-Hitler delusions about the Anglo-Saxon race and its superiority in the ad-
ministration of justice. The opinion doesn't say that the jury system is the only possible
method of achieving justice---but the implication is strong when this opinion is read In
the context of the legal philosophy which prevailed on the Court in the first half of this
century.
12. The Court has evidenced a continued respect for the jury system. See Beacon
Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) ; Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963). How-
ever, even the respect expressed for the jury system in Beacon and Simler do not neces-
sarily support the reasoning in Dimick.
13. See, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials, 273 U.S. 359 (1927): Crane
Iron Works v. Cox & Sons, 28 F.2d 328 (3rd Cir.1928). These cases illustrate the complex-
ity of the facts which may have to be established in an action for damages. An excellent
summary of the whole subject of evidence in actions for damages may be found in PRAC-
TICINO LAW INSTITUTE, DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH (1965).
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acquaint the legal profession with the appropriate criteria of fin-
ancial responsibility so that the same appellate court will not have
to waste time with a similar incomplete record in the immediate
future.1 '
A similar disposition of such "legal errors"-if I may
be permitted to categorize-as remarks of counsel,15  erroneous
admission of evidence, 16 errors in instructions"7 or failures to award
damages for specific items, would seem to be more appropriately
cured by reasoned remand. On the other hand, if the appellate
tribunal judges that the "legal error" was "harmless" or "non-
prejudicial", it would seem to be more efficient to let the jury
award stand. The danger seems to be that an appellate tribunal
may seek to justify its own judgment of what constitutes a proper
award by ascribing an apparent excess to what would otherwise
be considered "harmless" error. The cure for this problem lies
in judicial restraint-which means that each justice must think
through the problem on his own. And if he finds that reasonable
men could differ on the mathematical precision of the award he
should let the inferior judgment stand.
When a trial court grants a new trial conditioned by remittitur
or additur the court makes what is essentially an ad hoc decision
which has very little real effect upon the judicial process except
upon the immediate parties to the controversy. In this sense, the
decision of a trial court to modify a jury award is very similar
to the actual function of the jury itself-to make specific, particu-
larized decisions with no general implications. This exercise in
particularity can be justified insofar as the trial court has the
14. Quite frequently, references to the fact that the evidence does not support the jury
award are merely shorthand ways of saying that the judges of the appellate tribunal do
not agree with the jury on the precise amount of the economic loss sustained by the plain-
tiff. A good illustration of an appellate tribunal indulging in a type of speculation which
it should forego is Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 5 Cal. 2d 480, 55 P.2d 870
(1936), wherein the Supreme Court of California overturned a jury award of $62,500 for
damages to a middle-age cotton producer and sought to cure this excessive verdict by
ordering a deduction of $12,500. Why the evidence supported the newly affirmed verdict
of $50,000; but did not support the jury's verdict of $62,500 is nowhere explained in the
opinion. About all the guidance which this opinion supplies for lawyers and lower tribunals
is that a big loser may get a break at the appellate level if he keeps trying. Such a "rule
of law" hardly contributes to the orderly administration of justice. A number of these
cases are collected in Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 3 (1951).
15. In Brabeck v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 264 Minn. 160, 117 N.W.2d 921 (1962),
the attorney for the plaintiff directly addressed the decedent's children, who were seated
in th courtroom. The court sought to cure this error by reducing the F.E.L.A. award from
$110,000, to $90,000. In Josephson v. Wilbrew, 15 App. Div.2d 533, 222 N.Y.S.2d 739, 12
N.Y.2d 930 (1963), a judgment for $115,000 for wrongful death and $48,000 for pain was
reduced to $75,000 and $14,000 to correct the prejudicial argument on the part of plain-
tiff's counsel. A New York tribunal also sought to cure a sinister argument by defense
counsel by granting a conditional additur from $13,500 to $25,000. Metz v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Co., 215 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Contra, Irvine v. Gibson, 117 Ky. 306, 77 S.W.
1196 (1904).
16. Josephson v. Wilbrew, note 15 supra, also involved the erroneous admission of a
photograph. In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Carter, 202 Ark. 1026, 154 S.W.2d 824 (1941), a
verdict of $10,000 for a fracture of the coccyx was reduced to $1,000 because of the er-
roneous evidence admitted by the trial court. And in Crandall v. St. Mary's Hosp., 13 App.
Div.2d 595, 212 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1961), the device of remittitur was employed to reduce an
award of $35,000 to $16,000 for an ankylosed finger-thus curing the trial court's erron-
eous acceptance of speculative evidence about the damages which were not attributable to
plaintiff's Injury.
17. In Devaney v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 219 Cal.487, 27 P.2d 635 (1933), the trial
court's erroneous instructions on the Safety Appliance Act were "cured" by reducing a
verdict of $35,000 to $20,000.
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advantage of having access to the all important and frequently
decisive "demeanor evidence".
Of their very nature, the decisions of an appellate tribunal are
"law" and enunciate principles of general applicability binding upon
an entire state or nation. If there are legal errors in regards to
evidence or anything else in the cold and otherwise silent state-
ment of facts before it, the appropriate function of an appellate
tribunal consists in enunciating principles of general applicability
which are properly called law, or statements of public policy which
will serve as guides for the future. When, however, an appellate
court indulges in the common temptation to usurp the lower tri-
bunal's role of particularizer, it abrogates its true function and
enunciates "particulars" which serve no useful purpose except to
encourage future litigants to seek more detailed reviews of partic-
ulars in subsequent cases.
Expressed in a slightly different fashion: lower courts sit to
resolve all controversies which come within their jurisdiction be-
cause the alternative is chaos. Appellate tribunals sit to render a
principled judgment of more general applicability by reviewing what
has already been authoritatively determined at an inferior level.
When appellate courts become activists and particularists they risk
the danger of fomenting the primordeal chaos which the lower
courts seek to order initially and, usually, quite adequately.
The additur or remittitur procedure has been occasionally em-
ployed to correct another quite distinct type of problem which is
generally called an "inconsistent" jury verdict. This problem
arises when a jury finds the defendant liable but fails to assess
damages for a specific item such as pain and suffering. In a word,
the jury finds the defendant liable for the whole loaf but assesses
damages only for one half or one third as the case may be.18
If a trial court, with the demeanor evidence before it, declines to
alter a jury verdict in such a situation, it seems singularly in-
appropriate for an appellate court to intervene. The inconsistent
verdict, which is evidence of compromise, seems to be an inherent
part and parcel of the jury system. 19 Of course, the plaintiff's
attorney will argue, with some justification, that his cantankerous
client is still entitled to adequate compensation, despite his client's
unsociable attitude on the stand. On the other hand, the com-
promise verdict rests largely upon the demeanor evidence which is
inaccessible to the appellate tribunal. And the experienced trial
judge is in a much better position to see that justice is done in
18. One of the better reasoned opinions in this matter is found in Thompson v. Iannuzzi,
403 Pa.329, 160 A.2d 777 (1961). In the classic case of inconsistency (jury returns a ver-
dict for the plaintiff but awards no damages), the courts usually grant a new trial on
all the Issues. See, Clemets v. Veterans Cab. Co., 344 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. App. 1960).
19. This view is well expressed in Jackson v. Capello, 201 Pa. Super. 91, 191 A.2d 903
(1963) and Elza v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112, 152 A.2d 238 (1959).
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such an ad hoc type of situation. The point here is that the com-
promise verdict, in the vast majority of cases, usually evidences
a compromise agreement on the facts essential to establish liability.
Only in the exceptionally rare case where the factual proof of
liability in uncontradicted or, at least, quite clear and the trial
judge has failed to correct a clearly erroneous jury verdict, would
it seem appropriate for an appellate court to intervene. And in
such a rare instance, it seems that the better procedure would be
for the appellate tribunal to order a new trial limited to the question
of damages or even to one element of damages, rather than for
that tribunal to attempt to make a monetary assessment of damages
on its own. 20 Quite apart from the area of reasonable mathematical
precision, but inextricably interwoven with it, lies the trackless sea
of intangible elements: pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of
reputation, etc. Punitive damages seem particularly susceptible
to abuse and some states have flatly outlawed them on more
express grounds of public policy. 21  The problems of intangible
damages are most susceptible to resolution through the procedures
of additur and remittitur. And it is precisely in these areas that
these procedural devices should be conscientiously and intelligently
employed.
This focuses our attention once again upon the true role of
an appellate court. When is an award too great or too small?
There is no pat answer-only "factors" or "elements" which an
appellate tribunal should take into account. These "factors" have
been verbalized in terms of those occasions when a lower tribunal's
verdict reflects "passion and prejudice"-a formula which tells us
very little.22  Some of the criteria which may well be taken into
account are such factors as comparative verdicts in similar cases2
-without subscribing to the fallacy that there will never be iden-
20. See Thieneman v. Cameron, 126 So.2d 170 (Fla. App. 1961). The jury awarded
injured plaintiff for pain and suffering but made no award to her husband for medical
expenses he had incurred; loss of consortium, etc. Another good example is Henderson v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 188 Kan. 283, 362 P.2d 60 (1961), where a $5,000 award was
found inadequate for burns and electrical shock-new trial granted on all the issues.
21. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1S91). Contra,
Smithhisler V. Dutter, 157 Ohio St. 454, 105 N.E.2d 868 (1952).
22. In Mathis v. Atchison T. & S. F. R.R., 61 N.M. 330, 330 P.2d 482, 487
(1956), a $43,000 verdict to a railroad switchman for injury causing rupture and excessive
pain was held not excessive because:
The fact that a verdict appears to be excessive is not a ground for a
motion for a new trial. It is only when the excessive damages appear to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice that a new
trial may be granted for that reason. There is no standard fixed by law
for measuring the value of human pain and suffering. In every case of
personal injury a wide latitude is allowed for the exercise of the judgment
of the jury, and unless it appears that the amount awarded is so grossly
out of proportion to the injury received as to shock the conscience, this
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury.
23. See Van Norman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 320 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. App. 1959), wherein
the court considered a $62,500 award to a twenty-eight year old laborer and found it ex-
cessive in view of the fact that previous maximum recoveries had been between $40,000
and $45,000 for similar injuries. The court adopted the principle that reasonable uniformity
of awards is desirable and reduced the trial court's award to $47,400. In Vest v. Gay, 154
So.2d. 297 (Ala. 1963), the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed a verdict of $40,000 for
personal injuries received in an intersectional collision and expressed approval at the
comparative verdicts cited from Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d Supp. 1161. The court indicated that
these comparative verdicts afforded a valid basis for comparison.
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tical cases;2 4 the degree of fault of the defendant; the ability and
experience of the trial judge; 25 (very real factors in less populated
states where judges are more apt to be personally acquainted);
personal knowledge of the locale, etc.
The jury system of administering justice hopefully draws upon
the distilled experience of twelve common citizens who inevitably
administer justice by consensus. The learned members of an appel-
late tribunal, who may be woefully lacking in practical business
experience, distort the vital function of the common law when they
hastily substitute their judgment of practical justice for the jury's.
The purpose of the jury system is to give the learned and inevitably
isolated members of the appellate tribunal the benefit of a rough,
yet substantially just, appraisal of a community consensus on in-
tangible damages. The appropriate role of an appellate tribunal is
not to do mathematical justice in every case, but to set down
general guidelines wherein the lower tribunals may function ef-
fectively.
In this view the practice of some appellate courts in remitting
damages on a percentage basis, e.g., reducing the award by 10
percent or 15 percent seems to be an exercise in futility.26 The
appellate tribunal has no access to the demeanor evidence which
may support a trial court's percentage reduction remittitur. And,
in the nature of things, an appellate tribunal cannot possibly find
time to exhaustively review all the evidence in every damage action.
In summary, the author submits that the appropriate role for
an appellate tribunal lies in the exercise of considerable judicial
24. The dangers of simplistic reliance upon comparative verdicts as binding precedent
are stressed In Ahistrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873
(1955) ; Mendenhall v. MacGregor Triangle Co., 83 Idaho 145, 358 P.2d 860 (1961).
25. Mann v. Hunt, 283 App. Div. 140, 126 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1953).
Everyone would admit that there are circumstances in which a trial
Judge's duty may require him to set aside a verdict which is too high, too
low, or so wrong that It will not stand. The judge, indeed, has the active
and continuous burden of supervising the work of the juries which report
to him-the point of interference is not fixed on the caprice of judicial
individualism; it is rather arrived at by a synthesis of all the experience
that the judge has had; in the beginning as a law student, in the later
controversies of law practice. in the hearing of cases and the writing of
decisions, In the sum of all that he has absorbed in the courtroom and in
the library.
In the end it is an Informed professional Judgment: and although
lawyers might differ greatly about how the components of the judgment
are arranged and added up, there would be a very considerable agreement
about the result to be reached In any case once the facts were thoroughly
understood-even if the judges who look at the case on appeal would not
themselves have set the verdict aside had they acted in the first instance,
they should not find In this alone a ground for reversal. If the case comes
within the area within which judicial interference would not be regarded
by the profession as unreasonable, the exercise of the power thus to deal
with the verdict ought to be upheld.
Citing Mann, the Court in Butler v. General Motors Corp., 143 F.Supp. 261 (N.D.N.Y. 1956),
stated, "By this application of principle, which is fundamentally experience and instinct, I
shall grant the motion of the defendant for a new trial In this instance, unless the plain-
tiff . . . agrees to a remission of $40,000 of the verdict of $200,000 returned In his favor.
Despite the Inflationary trend of the day, I still have the sense that $160,000 is a lot of
money, but I feel It is justified by the extreme period of hospitalization undergone by
Greenslet previous to the amputation .... "
26. See Pitrowski v. New York, Chicago & St.L. R.R. 6 Il. App.2d 495, 128 N.E.2d
577 (1955), where a Jury verdict for injuries in a F.E.L.A. action was $150,000. The trial
court ordered a remittitur to $100,000. The appellate court reduced the trial court's judg-
ment by 10% to $90,000.
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restraint in the review of jury awards for damages which are in-
capable of being ascertained with mathematical precision.27  If
reasonable men can differ-and they usually can-on the monetary
value of such an award, the appellate tribunal should affirm the
inferior court's adjudication of the case. In the rare instance where
the lower award has been affirmatively proved to be unreasonable,
a higher court should make a cautious but dispassionate use of
such flexible procedural devices as additur and remittitur in order
to reduce the cost of obtaining justice for the injured party. Even
in reviewing the conditional grant of a new trial by a lower court
judge the same principles apply. The role of an appellate tribunal
does not consist in second guessing a trial judge on the precise
amount of a sum which cannot be calculated with mathematical
precision. In an appropriate case an appellate court should lay
down general principles to guide all trial courts. But it should deal
with monetary figures only when there has been a clear and af-
firmative showing of irrationality on the part of the inferior tribunal.2 8
Why should appellate courts follow this suggested procedure as
a matter of public policy? The basic justification rests upon a
perhaps undemonstrable assumption-that inferior tribunals are more
apt to act in a responsible manner if these tribunals are invested
with wide discretion. In terms of institutional competence, the
legislature with its potentially limitless power to investigate and
acquire factual or statistical evidence is in a far better position to
enact wise statutory limits of liability-if such limitations are deemed
necessary or appropriate. The proper institutional role for an ap-
pellate tribunal lies in its educative power over inferior tribunals.
A jury will, of course, be generally unfamiliar with the public
policy grounds which permit the jury to make a definitive as-
sessment of monetary damages. However, the lesson of judicial
restraint will not be ignored by the members of the bar. Once the
practicing attorneys are made to realize that they will not be
permitted an opportunity to re-litigate the details of damage actions
at the appellate level, they will be constrained to exert greater
care and show more professional competence at the trial level.
27. The philosophy of judicial restrain enunciated by James B. Thayer seems particu-
larly appropriate for the resolution of the controversies inherent in determining a just
compensation for damages. Tn Thayer's view, a court reviewing P, legislative act should
defer to the Judgment of that body so long as the legislature's choice is rational. Thus, in
the complex area of deliberate ambiguity in the written constitution, a wide range of choice
and judgment is left to the legislative responsibility. A pari, the courts of last resort should
sustain any rational determination made by an inferior tribunal, whether judge or jury
or combination of both. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Conatitutional Law', 7 Harv. Law Rev. 129, 143-144: 1 SELECTED ESSAYs ON CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW 503, 516-17 (1938). Perhaps the most eloquent expression of the doctrine of judicial
restraint is contained in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's memorable dissenting opinion in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) concerning Jeho-
vah's Witnesses children who refused to salute the flag in a public school.
28. The utility of the procedural device which we have termed remittitur in cases of
awards which "shock the conscience" is based upon the fact that most grossly excessive
awards are, In fact, usually based upon unquestioned liability wherein the conduct of the
defendant has been particularly outrageous and the jury Inclined to wreak vengeance.
Rather than force the plaintiff to submit to the rigors of a completely new trial the device
of remittitur seeks to remedy the situation in as expeditious a manner as possible.
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Expressed in a slightly different fashion, the underlying reasons
for great judicial restraint in reviewing awards for damages rest
upon concepts of political pluralism and subsidiarity. Essentially,
these ideas stress the importance of resolving local problems at the
local level. This policy can be effectuated only by granting a
large measure of autonomy to the inferior tribunals. A higher court,
charged with the more delicate task of determining issues of far
more than local significance will be better able to address itself
to more important issues if it budgets its time by adroitly refusing
to indulge in the futile exercise of second guessing the reasonable
estimates of a composite judgment of ordinary citizens. Following
this philosophy an appellate court will intervene only in the extra-
ordinary case where it is self-evident that a manifest injustice has
been perpetrated in an inferior tribunal. Anything short of mani-
fest injustice should be dismissed per curiam.
